Newsletter

03.01.2022 | 6'' read

Worm-spreading data wipers, ransomware, cyberwar…

by Ryan Naraine

* The most clicked link from the last newsletter was the Samba (CVE-2021-44142) exploitation horror story. The post-mortem on the Coinbase money-printing API bug was also very popular.

New podcast alert.

Monday blues.

If your inbox is anything like mine, you’re already being bombarded with PR/marketing invitations to webinars and whitepapers on industry-leading solutions to protect from cyberwar and Russian attacks. Trust me on this:  delete them all and move on with your life.

Despite all the noise, nothing has changed.  The foolproof way to minimize exposure to risk — and reducing attack surface — is to invest heavily in a handful of boring things: MFA everything everywhere, prioritize the patching of known exploited vulns (there’s a live catalog!),lock down cloud software configurations, enable super-logging for investigations, and keep working on those ransomware recovery tabletops.

No cybersecurity vendor can ship a product to stop cyberwar-related activity.  When vendors claim they can, put them in the ‘irrelevant’ bin where they belong.

Cheers, and remember to reboot those iPhones.

_ryan

On to the newsletter…

This is what they tell me cyberwar looks like.

Sure, the wording stinks, but it’s hard to find another description for the kinds of worm-like data-wiping attacks we’ve seen linked to kinetic war currently underway in Ukraine.  Let’s try to catch up:


SPONSORED.

  • Registration is open for SecurityWeek’s Supply Chain Security Summit on Wednesday, March 23, 2022. This virtual summit will examine the current state of supply chain attacks, the weakest links along the way, the biggest supply chain hacks in history, and best practices for managing this massive attack surface.

Meanwhile, Iran and China…

Speaking of apex-level nation-state malware activity, Symantec has found a super-stealthy backdoor linked to a Chinese APT actor first seen in 2012.  The Symantec report on Daxin confirms the Chinese have invested in a command-and-control mechanism similar to Regin.

MIT Technology Review’s Patrick Howell O’Neill looked at the paper and concluded it was China’s work to build a one-of-a-kind cyber espionage behemoth to last.

The skinny: “While Beijing’s hackers were once known for simple smash-and-grab operations, the country is now among the best in the world thanks to a strategy of tightened control, big spending, and an infrastructure for feeding hacking tools to the government that is unlike anything else in the world.”

Separately, the U.S. government spent a part of the week warning that Iranian government sponsored threat actors continue to take aim at global government and commercial networks.

The staggering ransomware wealth transfer.

From vx-underground on Twitter (take with multiple grains of salt):

The Conti ransomware leaks have unveiled Conti’s primary Bitcoin address.  From April 21st, 2017 – February 28th, 2022 Conti has received 65,498.197 BTC.  That is 2,707,466,220.29 USD.

In April last year, Emsisoft estimated that ransomware accounted for $74,632,036,933 moving from western countries to Russian criminal gangs.

Here’s another spicy Twitter thread on the Conti leaks suggesting links between Russian law enforcement and ransomware criminals.

Remember Log4Shell?

The SANS Internet Storm Center is reporting that attackers have lost interest in exploiting the Apache Log4j vulnerability.


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  • Using Symmetry DataGuard, cloud-security teams tighten IAM policies around data, incident response teams know precisely what data objects are involved in a breach, and governance teams audit every access across every data store. Schedule a demo.

Must-see research projects.

Hacking things.
Naming and shaming.

Shoutout to Scott Piper for putting together the IMDSv2 Wall of Shame documenting vendors that do not allow customers to enforce IMDSv2 in their accounts.

  • Crowdstrike Falcon
  • Databricks
  • Fidelis CloudPassage Halo
  • Okta ASA agent
  • Palo Alto firewalls
In the wake of the 2019 Capital One breach, AWS released IMDSv2 as a way of mitigating SSRF attacks against EC2s that could steal the credentials of their IAM roles. By default, EC2s still allow the old Instance MetaData Service (IMDSv1) and so special action must be taken to require IMDSv2. The insecurity of IMDSv1 has been presented at major security conferences for years, such as Black Hat in 2014.

People.

Tangentially.

An interview with Michal Zalewski on his new book on surviving the end of the world.  I’m reading this book now and will have a review next week.  P.S. It’s very good.

P.S. Full podcast episodes are available on the SecurityConversations.com home page, and on all major platforms. Subscribe directly: Apple/iPhoneGoogle/AndroidSpotify and Amazon/Audible.
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